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OVERVIEW
To look at individual industries in isolation could be rather m?aningless.
But if one compares different industries, significant conclusions can be
reached about the system as a whole. Gold raining was the industry in which
it W3S most difficult to organise the black labour force. The economically
most advantageous strategy for white trade unionism there was that of a
labour aristocracy, which coincided perfectly with ideologies of white
supremacy. Building and iron, steel and engineering resembled gold mining
more than they did the light industries. In the light industries (eg.
clothing, extiles, sweets, tobacco, food and canning) the economically
most advantageous strategy for white trade unionism was the organisation
of all workers in the industry. The resulting cooperation between black
and white unions conflicted with ideologies of white supremacy. In the
long term, however, no significant portion of the white labour force was
won over to belief in racial equality.
The importance of migrant labour in preventing organisation in gold mining
raises the question of its significance in other industries. In clothing,
laudering and the commercial distributive trade relatively strong black
organisation coincided with high levels of permanent urbanisation and low
levels of job turnover. In clothing levels of urbanisation and job turn-
over were probably a consequence of strong unionisation rather than its
initial cause. In the cases of laundering and the commercial distributive
trade, the evidence is more in favour of permanent urbanisation and/or low
turnover being causes of strong unionisation. Government officials believed
in n connection between permanent black' urbanisation and the ability to
create strong black trade unions. On the other hand, two of the most
militant groups of workers in South African - Durban stevedores and Johann-
esburg coal distributive workers - were migrants and this has to be explained.
Something which would require a paper to itself and which I have touched
upon only in passing is> the question of divisions among employers and their
significance for trade unionism. I have mentioned how such divisions
assisted both the African Commercial and Distributive Workers' Union and
the Garment Workers' Union. This may be contrasted with the unified fronc
put forward by the gold mining companies against increased black wages.
Much research remains to be done on this.
Francis Wilson has calculated that between 1910 and 1960 real black wages
in gold mining remained static.(1) The low grade ore of the Rand mines
meant that working costs were high in relation to profits. Wages had to be
kept low so that profits could be maintained. At the turn of the century
management bitterly opposed the attempts of white mine workers to organise
and obtain higher wages. Management failed because there was a limit to the
coercion which could be used against white mine workers. There were no such
limits on the coercion which could be used against black mine workers and
management has been successful to this day in preventing their organisation.
In the early years of the industry the mining houses competed amongst them-
selves for a limited supply of black labour. Such competition bid up the
price of black labour, threatening the viability of those mines whose ore
cost relatively more to extract. The mining houses combined to create a
recruiting monopsony which kept black wages down: This was done through Che
establishment of the Native Recruiting Corporation, the Witwatersrand Native
Labour Association and the 'maximum average1 wage system. During the
1930's and 1940's the rock-hard front of the mining houses against black
wage increases was one of the major problems confronting the African Mine
Workers' Union; but there was a whole range of other problems, which the
Union was ultimately unable to surmount.
Virtually all black mine workers were migrant labourers. (A necessary pre-
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condition of low mine wages was that miners' families should live in Che
rural areas and support themselves by agriculture.)(2) The very high turn-
over rate of the black mine labour force - the constant coming and going of
migrant workers - rendered it difficult to create the sort of group solid-
arity which makes collective action possible; the creation of a permanent
worker organisation was impossible without outside aid. The one group of
long-serving, 'permanently urbanised' black workers in the mining industry ~
the mine clerks - formed an Association which was recognised by the Chamber
of Mines. Management attempted to cut the mine clerks off from the migrants'
struggles by giving them superior pay and status. (It was the failure of
the Chamber of Mines to continue this policy during world war two - when
inflation eroded the clerks' real wages - which led to some clerks joining
the African Mine Workers' Union, considerably increasing its strength as an
organisation.)
While the high turnover consequent upon migrant labour made it impossible
for the black mine workers to create an organisation by themselves, the
compound system rendered it possible to cut the black mine workers off
from any attempt to organise them from outside.
The state regarded it as vitally important to keep black wages on the gold
mines down. The gold mines never experienced the occasional interventions
by agents of the state to raise black wages which took place in commerce
and industry - eg. Wage Determination 70 for the commercial Distributive
Trade, 1939. Instead the state was prepared to use massive armed force
against striking black mine workers - as happened in 1920 and again in
1946.
Unlike their counterparts in such industries as clothing, the white mining
unions showed no interest whatever in organising black workers. They con-
centrated all their efforts on raising their own members' wages and keeping
cheap black labour out of skilled jobs. Indeed the relatively high wages
of the white mine workers in a sense depended upon the very much lower
level of wages paid to the black mine workers. (During the 1930's and 1940's
white wages were approximately ten times black wages.)(3) English-speaking
miners were very quick to see black mine workers from the point of view of
white supremacy. In the case of Afrikaner mine-workers - in a majority
after world war one - the conditions of the mining industry reinforced a
white racist ideology which had already been imbibed in rural white society.
Obstacles to black organisation were somewhat less formidable in the build-
ing and iron, steel and engineering industries - but still very great. In
these industries the white craft unions were sufficiently strong to exclude
blacks from skilled jobs. The limitation of blacks to unskilled work
meant that if they went on strike they could easily be replaced. Owing to
the continuous inflow of rural blacks, there was a permanent surplus of
unskilled labour in the towns.
The white craft unions in building and engineering were marginally more
liberal than the mining unions in that at successive S A Trades and Labour
Council conferences during the 193O's they mostly supported the principle
of black workers being included under the Industrial Conciliation Act.
Throughout the 193O's and 194O's however, they did nothing to encourage
black worker organisation, pressing demands only behalf of their own members
and largely ignoring the interests of the black workers. From at least the
lace 1930's the building and engineering industrial councils were notorious
for their lack of concern for black interests. (The engineering council's
reputation for this has persisted up to the present.) As in the gold mining
industry, the relatively high wages of the white workers were conditional
upon the black workers remaining low paid and unorganised.
Gold, engineering, building: in these crucial industries the structure of
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the work-force and the strategies adopted by white unions harmonised with,
ideologies of white supremacy. During the twenties, thirties ar.d forties
there was another group of industries where the' most rational strategy for
white unions was the creationvof parallel black unions. These industries
included inter alia clothin, laundering, sweets, tobacco, leather, textiles
food and canning, and tin-can manufacture. J J Evans, secretary of the
African Tin Workers' Union described a situation which - with variations -
obtained in all these industries:
In the industry which we represent, Europeans, Coloured and
Native Workers are engaged here at the same process of work,
under the same conditions and for the same wages. The
European and Coloured workers are in a minority though. And
if we are not allowed to organise,the native workers in our
industry, then the union of the European and Coloured workers is
completely ineffective and cannot protect the interests of its
members.(A)
In tin-can manufacture there were actually very few whites employed. The
membership of the African Tin Workers' Union in 1937 consisted of 122 black*
and 81 Coloureds. In clothing, sweets, tobacco, leather and textiles in
that same year the majority of the workers were by contrast whites (mostly
AFrikaner women). But otherwise Evans summed up the pressures on white
unions to organise blacks quite well. If any attempts were made to improve
white wages without organising blacks, the employers would simply bring in
cheap black labour. Unlike in building or engineering the amount of skill
required of most white workers was such that they could easily be replaced
by untrained blacks (or whites). Indeed the white workers had not been
strongly enough organised to keep blacks out of skilled or semi-skilled
jobs.
In January 1928 Ben Weinbren of the (white). Launderers, Cleaners and Dyers
Union noted that highly skilled white dyers receiving £7.10.0 per week
were being replaced by blacks:
The reason being of course the lower rates the natives would
accept... The only remedy was to organise them and raise their
status.(5)
The secretary of the Witwatersrand Tailors Association stated that blacks
were superseding white girls in the clothing industry:
There was a possibility of 200 more European workers being
employed in the industry if the non-Europeans become organised
and an agreement regarding wages is arrived at. There were
some natives in the industry who were skilled and receiving
fairly good wages.(6)
D tring 1928 the Native Laundry Workers' Union (the first black industrial
union) was founded by Ben Weinbren. It entered into a cooperative relation-
ship with the white union. So did the (black) Soufh AFrican clothing
Workers' Union1" founded the same year. In the clothing industry cooperation
between the black union and the registered Garment Workers' Union has con-
tinued almost without interruption to the present day.
In 1937 organisers from the Garment Workers' Union formed unions of white,
workers in the tobacco and sweet industries. The extent to which blacks
were doing the same semi-skilled jobs as whites in the tobacco industry is
illustrated by the following table.
4/
- 4 -
TABLE I: Distribution of Workers in the Tobacco industry. Union of South
Africa, according to race, sex and occupation, November 1940.
White Males White- females Native males
Adult Juvenile
Grade I 4 36 20
Grade II 72 397 384 138
Grade III 16 . 24 24 ' 84
Labourers 66 24 45 444
(Grades I, II, and III are semi-skilled.)
Source: adapted from 'Report of Wage Board... Tobacco Industry, Union',
1.12.41.
The situation in the sweet industry appears to have been roughtly similar.
Parallel African Sweet and Tobacco Workers' Unions were consequently formed.
Before effective unions were formed, the conditions of white women workers
in clothing, laundering, sweets, tobacco etc. were very bad. Wages were
20/- to 30/- per week (similar to the wages of most black workers), hours
were long, workshops were usually overcrowded and dirty. Employers were
bitterly resistant to unionisation, frequently victimising union members.(7)
Employers wanted to keep wages low because these industries were intensely
competitive: most of. them (particularly clothing) could be entered with
relatively little capital. It was the less well capitalised employers who
bore down most hard upon the workers. The GArment Workers' Union struck
up a tacit alliance with the better-capitalised employers: these would
recognise the union and by forcing wages up throughout the industry the
• union would drive the under-capitalised and less efficient employers out of
business. No doubt other unions were able to do the same-
White racism was part of the culture of the Afrikaner workers in these
industries, most of whom were recent immigrants from the Platteland. The
militant strike action required of these workers if they were to improve
conditions had the effect of heightening class consciousness and damping
down race consciousness - at least for a time. For example: the six week
Johannesburg sweet workers strike in 1942. Here the striking Afrikaner
women workers were subjected to considerable violence at the hands of white
employers and police, trying to protect white strike-breakers. On the other
hands black sweet workers showed solidarity with the white strikers by
refusing to cross their picket-lines. Every day the black and white strikers
would march together through Johannesburg streets. AT mass meetings at the
City Hall, black and white stood apart, but at strike committee meetings
there was no such segregation. White girl workers spoke up in favour of
giving blacks and whites equal strike pay, and this was done.(8) According
to one Labour Department official, the August 1948 sweet workers' strike
was caused by the white workers' refusal to accept a pay offer for themselves
which excluded the black workers. Here again the black workers refused to
cross picket lines and the strike was successful.
The Afrikaner Nationalists were terrified that the left-wing union leadership
would succeed in permanently weaning the Afrikaner women workers away from,
white racialism (and Afrikaner nationalism) and towards a purely class
orientation.
From the second half of the 1930's the F.A.K.'and the Dutch Reformed Church
spearheaded a campaign to stir up national and racial feeling among white
workers. This involved vilifying union leaders as both 'communists' and
'kaffir-boeties'. Solly Sachs of the Carment Workers' Union was a particular
target. Here is an example of the techniques used. At the 'Belfast'
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clothing factory in Johannesburg in 19't4 Coloured workers had been brought
in to work in the same rooms as the white workers. (Blacks and Coloureds
entered the industry in large numbers during thewar because white women were
finding better jobs outside the clothing industry.) One morning nine
predikants walked into the factory and started questioning the whites
about their relations with the Coloureds.
One of the Predikants asked Mr Dunsky if he could not put up
a partition between the workers so as to prevent the
European workers from inhaling the bad breath of the non-
European workers.(9)
Such tactics had considerable success among the white workers. Sachs felt
forced to appease white racism by such actions as the formation of a No. 2
Branch of the Union in 1940: in which Coloured workers were segregated and
for some years denied direct representation on the union's executive committee.
But most white workers remained loyal - casically because of the success of
militant left-wing leaders like Sachs in improving wages and conditions.
During the 1950's white membership of unions in clothin, textiles, sweets,
tobacco etc. dwindled as white women found better-paying jobs elsewhere
and blacks and Coloureds moved into replace them. The portion of the white
working class in industries where left-wing leadership might hope to lead
them to a purely class orientation fell drastically. Simultaneously the
existing left-wing trade union leadership was removed by banning orders under
the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950. Intimidated by the threat of
repression, the surviving leadership of the registered leather and clothing
unions moved towards an apolitical (i.e. right-wing) stance. Under the
continued protection of the registered Garment Workers' Union, the National
Union of Clothing Workers has grown to be the largest black union in
South A jrica. (10)
By contrast, during the 195O's, certain of the unions in this same group
of industries formed the backbone of SACTU: these were the registered
unions and the parallel black unions in the food and canning, laundry and
textile industries.(11) (Some of the black clothing workers belonged to
the S A Clothing Workers' Union, which joined SACTU; others joined the
more conservative Garment Workers' Union of African Women, the ancestor of
the National Union of Clothing Workers.) The workers in these industries
showed militancy not only on bread-and-butter issues but by giving particularly
strong support to the general stay-at-ahome strikes called by the Congress
Alliance in the late 1950's and early 196O's. Their political militancy
was eventually crushed out of them by intensive state repression in the
early 196O's. But hte registered unions in these industries have continued
to see the necessity of organising black workers.
One of the unique things about South Africa's industrialisation has been
the ecormously important role of migrant labour. If we accept that the
complete dominance of the migrant labour system and the consequent very high
labour turnover have been crucial obstacles to black worker organisation
on the gold mines, this raises the question of how other industries com-
pared with gold mining in this regard.
Firstly one looks at the industries in which black trade unionism was
relatively weak. W G Ballinger wrote of the African Mineral Water Workers'
Union.
The organisation is not strong, mainly owing, it is said,
to the migrant class of labourer which the trade employs
and to the seasonal fluctuations which characterize the trade.(12)
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A high proportion of migrants and high job turnover seem to have been factors
serving to weaken trade unionism in the cement, stone and brick and clay
industries.(13) A definite handicap to the organisation of black building
workers was the casual nature of their employment.Kl4) (It is possible -
but not certain - that these workers were migrants.)
The evidence as to whether the organisation of black workers in iron, steel .
and engineering was hampered by high job turnover, the misrant labour system
and residence in compounds is however rather contradictory. On the one hand
the employers told the Fagan Commission that most of the workers were
migrants. On the other hand the 1950 Transvaal Chamber of Industries
Survey found that black workers in 'engineering' were 70 per cent permanently
urbanized, while the 1948 Witwatersrand University survey showed that labour
turnover in the 'metal' industry between 1939 and 1943 was no higher than
in the Commercial distributive trade, where a most successful black trade
union emerged. In this industry it would seem reasonable (at.least until
more evidence emerges) to emphasize black exclusion from skilled jobs as
the basic reason for the exceptional weakness of black unionism in this
industry from the 1920's right through to the 195O's.
I now propose to look in considerable detail at laundering, clothing and
the commercial distributive trade: all cases in which relatively strong
black unions coincide with low levels of labour turnover and high levels
of permanent urbanisation. For each' industry in turn I will firstly present
the data relating to union strength and then that relating to urbanisation
and turnover.
LAUNDERINC
A. UNION STRENGTH
The Native Laundry Workers' Union is reported to have been the first African
Trade Union ever to be formed - in 1927 or early 1928.(15) The skilled
jobs (especially, as pressers) occupied by m laundry workers undoubtedly
helped make possible their long record of strike action. Of four strikes
at individual laundries in May and June 1928 and October 1929, three were
successful in that victimized workers were reinstated. In the fourth case
the employer was adamant in refusing to reinstate several leading workers.
However the strikers had no difficulty in finding jobs in other Johannes-
burg laundries, presumably because their skills were in short supply. (There
was by contrast a permanent surplus of unskilled black labour in the towns.)
The success of strikes over victimisation suggests that black laundry
workers were creating a relatively strong shopfloor organisation. The
laundry workers struck again in 1931, 1934 and 1936. The result of the 1931
strike is not known but those in 1934 and 1936 were at least partially
successful. They occured at a time when the black working class in general
was not very militant at all. In fact the December 1936 strike was the
only strike of black workers on the Witwatersrand in that year.(16) For
reasons which are not yet clear, little is hoard of the union during the
war years. But there were strikes in 1945, 1946 and 1947.
B.' URBANISATION/TURNOVER
In December 1936 it was estimated that no less than 97% of the African
laundry workers had been in service for more than six months: a phenomenally
low rate of labour turnover.(17) The 1938 Wage Board Report also refers
to the exceptionally lwo labour turnover in this industry.(18) In his memo-
randum to the Wage Board in 1937, Max Gordon estimated that 803! of the black
laundry workers were permanently urbanised.(19) In 1950 87% of a sample
of 1530 black laundry workers were found to be permanently urbanised. By
contrast only 46% of a sample of 26 500 workers drawn from 26 industries
were permanently urbanised.(20)
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CLOTHING
A. UNION STRENGTH
The black clothing workers in Johannesburg are unique in that ever since
the S.A. Clothing Workers' Union was founded in 1928 there has been a
black trade union ins their industry. The National Union of Clothing
. Workers is at present by far the largest black union in existence. These
facts represent success - of a sort. In 1939 the skilled black workers
in the clothing industry were one of the best-paid groups of black workers
in Johannesburg: the half of them who had six years experience received
£12 per month (triple the average wage of unskilled blacks).(21) On the
other hand - except in 1928-1929 - the black clothing workers do not have
a record of independent militancy comparable to that of the black laundry
workers. Blacks were a majority of the workers in the laundry industry
and the white union collapsed in 1934 and was only revived during the war.
In clothing by contrast blacks in 1938 were only 1000 out of a total labour
force of 8000, predominantly white women.(22) The black union was an
appendage of the registered Garment Workers' Union - which bred apathy
among the black workers.
B. URBANISATION/TURNOVER
In 1939 it was estimated that- 30% of the black clothing workers in Johannes-
burg had been in service for six years or more.(23) These were all skilled
pressers. Data on 40 African workers.(all, or mostly, pressers) involved
in a dispute at Star Shirt in Johannesburg in 1947 shows that only 15% had
been employed at Star Shirt for six months or less, while 40% had been
employed at Star Shirt for at least three years, 70% had been in the cloth-
ing industry for at least three years and 482 had been in the industry for
six years or more.(24) These figures reveal an exceptionally low rate of
labour turnover and virtually all of such a. stable labour force must have
been permanently urbanised.
COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTIVE TRADE
A. UNION STRENGTH
The African commercial and Distributive Workers' Union (ACDWU) was perhaps
the single most successful African trade union. Its first major success
came in 1937, when the union was successful in obtaining
improved conditions for the Native employees of a number
of the large commercial firms in Johannesburg, viz. OK Bazaars,
Mosenthal & Co., MacDonald Adams, Vacuum Oil and numerous
others.(25)
The next great success was lWage Determination 70 which gave unskilled
labourers in the trade £6 per month: Virtually the highest wage for black
labourers on the whole of the Witwatersrand. A further substantial increase
was gained at the beginning of 1944, when the ACDWU also became one of the
few African unions to obtain the stop-order privilege. Even in 1950, in a
period of general decline of African trade unionsim, it still had 2000 paid-
up members and was the largest black union in existence.
B. URBANISATION/TURNOVER
The most militant group among the union membership - the black coal dis-
tributive workers - appear to have been rural migrants. (This is further
discussed'below.) The majority of the union's membership was however made
up out of the much larger body of labourers in the commercial distributive
trade proper.
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(i) The 1939 Wage Board Report stated that:
It It is generally admitted that the majority of the unskilled
workers employed in commerce are town dwellers...(26)
(The greater needs of urbanised workers - as compared to migrants -
were used to justify the substantial increase recommended by the
Board.)
(ii) The mean annual turnover of a representative sample of black workers
in Johannesburg 1939-1943 was 105%.(27) That of workers in commerce
was 106%. That of workers in metals was 109%. These figures imply
that labour turnover had nothing to do with whatever made the ACDWU an
outstandingly successful union, while the metal union by contrast was
unsuccessful.
(iii)Ellen Hellmann's Sellgoods: A Sociological Survey of An African Commer-
cial Labour Force reports that labour turnover at a particular large
concern (OK Bazaars) in 1951 was only about 33% per year. Moreover
61% of the departures during 1951 belonged to the 0-1 year length of
services category, and only 17% (15 workers) belonged to the 6 years
plus category which made up 30% of the total black labour force.
(Moreover two of these 15 were merely being transferred to another
branch and five were going on pension.) The longer length of service
categories consequently formed a 'stable nucleus' within the work
force. It was these workers who gave the union its remaining numerical
strength at SEllgoods: since by 1951 the union had become virtaully
impotent, the workers' continued loyalty to it is attributable to the
successes it had won during the war. One could go further to say
that low job turnover among longer-serving workers was probably a
consequence of the union's wartime successes rather than a cause. The
figures for mean labour turnover in commerce are 137% in 1939 and
103% in 1943. They support the view that the period 1938-1951 saw a
progressive decline in labour turnover in the trade.(28)
CONCLUSION
In clothing low labour turnover and high permanent urbanisation were
probably a consequence of the union's strength rather than its cause. The
crucial factor behind the black union was clearly the long term need of
the Garment Workers' Union to stop skilled black workers from undercutting
white wages - which could only be done by organising them. The registered
union saw to it that skilled black workers received relatively high wages,
with increments for experience. The consequent privileged status of black
clothing workers would thus explain the many years for which a lot of them
stayed on in the industry. The stability of this labour force would become
a source of strength to the union.
The available figures do not suggest that the unusually low labour turn-
over in commerce was an initial cause of the union's strength. It seems
rather to have been a consequence of such strength. However the report
that the trade's workers included an unusually high proportion of permanent-
ly urbanised blacks is roughly contemporary with the union's first successes.
The 1952 Wage Board Report stated that:
The wage standards of the unskilled labourer group in commerce
have always been and still are considerably higher than those
of unskilled workers in other industries. This is in recognition
of the fact that generally a higher standard of intelligence and
ability is required of these labourers.(29)
Whatever 'intelligence and ability' was required of these labourers -
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whether it included literacy or ability to deliver goods by bicycle all
over Che town - permanently urbanised blacks were more likely than 'raw'
rural migrants to possess. This 'intelligence and ability' may have
increased both these workers' bargaining power and their ability to organise
a union.(30) There are other factors which must be brought into any
explanation of the growth of the ACDWU. They are: the outstandingly able
leadership of its secretary, Daniel Koza (1940-1951); Wage Determination
70 in 1939, and divisions between large and snail commercial employers
with regard to increasing black wages. These divisions showed themselves
in 1943 when the Hitwatersrand employer organisations agreed to give the
ACDWU a 10/- per week increase; smaller employers protested that this
increase might be approved of by the large employer but would ruin them:
they formed an association to protect their interests.(31) Such divisions
may have influenced the Wage Board to grant the considerable increase which
it embodied in Wage Determination 70.
In laundering much of the evidence regarding the permanency must have
produced a strong sense of group solidarity: a pre-condition of militancy.
The workers' skill increased their bargaining power, thus encouraging
militancy. The workers' permanency was linked to their acquisition of
skill in that shifting migrants would have been impossible to train. One
thing which is not known is whether the black laundry workers of the
1920s and 193O's were linked in any way to the self-employed black laundrymen
who carried out this service before large-scale 'factory' laundries financed
with white capital became dominant on the Witwatersrand.(32)
State officials were certainly conscious of a relationship between per-
manent black urbanisation and black trade unionism. Severl of those
Labour Department officials who in the late 1940's advocated the (limited)
recognition of African trade unions felt.that such recognition should be
confined to 'the permanent, urbanised native'. No trade union of black
gold miners should be recognised. These officials were aware of the obstacle
which high labour turnover posed to the unionisation of black gold miners.
They felt that migrant labourers generally were more difficult to organise
than permanently urbanised blacks. Limited recognition would have to be
extended to the relatively strong unions of the urbanised because to try
to suppress such unions would be too dangerous. Instead this relatively
strong group of workers would be co-opted by being extended privileges
denied to the great majority of black workers.
Given that government officials have seen- a connection between trade
unionism and permanent urbanisation, this raises the question of whether
the influx control measures introduced since 1948 have not inter alia been
intended to make union organisation more difficult. The tightening up of
influx control made it progressively more difficult for rural migrants to
acquire permanent urban residence rights. Without such rights any loss of
one's job would lead to expulsion from the urban area - a very strong deter-
rent to militancy. Moreover in urban centres like Johannesburg the influx
restrictions have led to a widening of the gap between permanently urbanise
and rural/migrant workers: with different economic and social circumstances,
as well as cultural differences, it is difficult to organise solidarity
between these groups.
However certain groups of migrants have been - and still are - decidedly
militant. The two examples I will deal with here are the Johannesburg
coal distributive workers and the Durban stevedores.(33)
During the war the coal distributors were probably the most militant group
of black workers on the whole Witwatersrand. They fought three strikes:
in December 1940, May 1941 and June 1944. The latter two were both sub-
stantial successes. In the JUne 1944 strike some 800 workers - virtually
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the entire Johannesburg labour force - offered themselves for arrest at
Marshall Square after their lender, Daniel Koza. of the ACDWU, had been
charged with incitement to strike. This was a display of solidarity far
larger than any single incident in the 1952 Defiance Campaign. I don't as
yet know much about their fortunes in the thirty years since the war. I
do know that: in May 1975 an article appeared in the Johannesburg press to
the effect that'Che coal distributive employers had promised their workers
an increase to ward off a threat to strike.
The Durban stevedores had at least two wartime strikes - in August 1941 and
July 1942. Their other major strikes were in 1949, 1954, 1958 and 1972.
(The 1972 strike helped lay the trail for the great wave of strike action
in Durban, 1973-1974) The stevedores were remarkable ior their ability to
organise collective action without depending upon a formal union structure.
(The repression to which such structures are exposed in a South African con~
text ensures that they are either smashed out of existence or generate a
leadership intent upon moderating rank and file militancy.) The stevedores1
self-reliance was such that they were capable of rejecting outsiders'
well-mer.nt attempts to organise them - as happened during the war.
Why have the Durban stevedores been so militant? Stevedores all over the
world are an unusually militant body of workers. To explain this it is
necessary to examine the nature of work in this industry. Stevedoring is
dangerous and it is carried out in groups. Consequently che success and
safety of each worker depends upon the skill and goodwill of his fellow
workers. It would se.em that this promotes group solidarity, which manifests
itself in disputes with management. One feature peculiar to stevedoring
in Durban was that - unlike in so many South AFrican industries - the bar-
gaining power of the black workers was not diluted by the presence of a
group of white workers holding the more skilled jobs and refusing to support
the blacks. The Durban stevedores have been described as a tightly-knit .
community of Zulus. Migrants would seek work on the Durban docks year
after year. The relatively small size of the labour force facilitated
the development of community: there were only a few thousand stevedores.
An additional factor making for cohesion was probably that stevet'ores in.
Durban also knew each other in the rural areas from which they had come.
By comparison with stevedoring the greater difficulty of organising black
mine workers is clear. The roles of the white mine workers, the compound
system and the state have been referred to above. Differences in the
nature of the two labour forces are also significant. Firstly, there is the
ethnic heterogeneity of the mine labour force. (To this day management is
afraid of the greater potential militancy of an ethnically homogeneous
mine labour force). Then - possibly - there is the consideration that
unlike on the docks few workers returned to work on the same mine year
after year. There'is evidence (drawn from Durban in the 194O's) to suggest
that after one or two visits to the mines as young men, workers preferred
to seek employment in commerce and industry.
To what extent do the arguments raised about stevedoring apply also to the
Johannesburg coal distributive workers? They are fairly definitely known
to have been migrants, but where they came from and whether a common rural
origin may help explain their remarkable solidarity is not yet known.(34)
As in the case of stevedoring, there were virtually no white workers in
the industry. The work was exceptionally heavy and dirty: this may have
increased the workers' bargaining power by making it more difficult to
secure seacs in the event of a strike. It may also have had implications
at the level of consciousness. The small-size of the labour force - only
800 workers in Johannesburg - could also have contributed to solidarity.
Another feature of the work was that it was seasonal, reaching a peak during
raid-winter. The employer was relatively likely to give in if the workers'
struck at this time of the year, especially when demand for coal was running
unusually high, as when there was exceptionally cold weather. This industry
deserves further investigation. -
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Table tl: S t a t i s t i c s of 'urbanized and r u r a l N a t i v e s ' ~
eniuloyoIT in secondary industry in the Southern Transvaal
in'l'JiiO.
Industry
Textile
3rick and clay
Milling
Tobacco
Printing
Millinary
Venetian 31inds
i-Iineral V'aOars
Typewriter & Oi'Iice
Appliances
Paper
Canvas ana Allied Trades
Chevied
fl silent
Tea and Coffee
Body Builders
linjineorintj
?1.3.te u las b
v laundries,Dry Cleanero.
etc.
3atteries
i'ood Products
Breweries
Leather
Rubber
Brush and Broom
Diamond J^vcing
Match.
i'.io c el .Iane ou s
Ho. of clack
workers
employed
723
5883
1294
343
5
134
95
60S
242
301
261-
6S98
1470
' 133
9 6 •
1280
42
1530 '
483
540
758 . . .
477
394
162
5
162
2342
fi permanently
•urbanized.
40
30
67
45
ICO
83
72
65 <
69
32
65
24
30
a 9
60
70
14
87
52
62
29
80
59
94
0
71
77
'H'm above information i s derived fro;n ^
supplied to the Transvaal Gharribei1 oi indus t r i e s by £cl
I ' i r a s . IX;t oi a t o t a l nu:;ibcr of 26,559 black workers
e::iyloyed by tiieoe f i rms, 4G>J v/ere 'urbctni^ed ' . The
oef i t i t i o n of 'urbai i izsd ' u^cd w o^ as
-•-u urbanized na t ive i s one who r e s ides
o:r;.;.-.a«nxly in or nt'-r an inciiiu brial iaod town
or -•'Lx.v, v/tio hi3 ."'.oat uicn v/it:i the lano , n.is
no zhi.tii or iici-dcan, ani depend s o y
eiU"";invi> in. indust ry lor hi3 l i v e l i h o o d .
oourcu: y
c-.ied 10 .7 .50 , M. S:r.uta
b  Ttanava:il
\
r
''?.blelB: Duration of joos unions black workers-in
Industry Percentage of completedjobs which had routed •
Police
Transport
Builii ing-
Flats ,hotels ,
clubs
Stone anc clay
Pood
v
 Kctals
Conferee
Cheinicala
V/ood
Rubber
Veliiclas
Textiles
leather
1/n.uer 6 .
months
55.7
63.0
61.6
42.6
57.0
45.5
50.8'.
49.4 •
45.3
42.6
44.7
41.0
41.0
Z'l
31.0 «
o yeara an
over
1
4
3
2
7
5
6,
• 7 ,
6,
8.
8.
10 .
1 4 .
1 3 .
1 7 .
.4
.2
.0
.0
.4
.4
.1
.0
.5
.5
.1
,2
,C
1
7
1:2 a
Mean
Annual
{Turnover.
192
16'0
160
114
ill
109 .
106
101
94
SG
85
' 65
. 64
55
1 C 5 •
Source: b'nivarsity oi' the ./if.vit;r.;i'.::iJ,
>;coio;r,ica, Industrial ftsscarcl'i ^sctio.-i, -x
4;:plove.;—;; i il)'i^, 'iV.::le AyVl'£I(aii;ip;o.':).
ent of
rban
\ \
